Epistemic Priority or Aims of Research? A Critique of Lexical Priority of Truth in Regulatory Science

Varghese J.

Full metadata record

DC Field	Value	Language
dc.rights.license	All Open Access, Bronze	-
dc.contributor.author	Varghese J.	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2023-11-30T08:55:28Z	-
dc.date.available	2023-11-30T08:55:28Z	-
dc.date.issued	2022	-
dc.identifier.issn	1333-1108	-
dc.identifier.other	EID(2-s2.0-85133556010)	-
dc.identifier.uri	https://dx.doi.org/10.52685/CJP.22.64.2	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/123456789/896	-
dc.description.abstract	A general criterion for distinguishing between epistemic and non-epistemic values is that the former promotes the attainment of truth whereas the latter does not. Daniel Steel (2010, 2016) is a proponent of this criterion, although it was initially proposed by McMullin (1983). There are at least two consequences of this criterion	en_US
dc.description.abstract	(i) it always prioritizes epistemic values over non-epistemic values in scientific research, and (ii) it overlooks the diverse aims of science, especially the aims of regulatory or policy-oriented science. This criterion assumes the lexical priority of truth or lexical priority of evidence. This paper attempts to show a few inadequacies of this assumption. The paper also demonstrates why epistemic priority over non-epistemic values is a problematic stance and how constraining the role of non-epistemic values as 'tiebreakers' may undermine the diverse aims of science. © 2022 Kruzak. All rights reserved.	en_US
dc.language.iso	en	en_US
dc.publisher	Kruzak	en_US
dc.source	Croatian Journal of Philosophy	en_US
dc.subject	aims of science	en_US
dc.subject	epistemic values	en_US
dc.subject	lexical priority of truth	en_US
dc.subject	non-epistemic values	en_US
dc.subject	Science and values	en_US
dc.title	Epistemic Priority or Aims of Research? A Critique of Lexical Priority of Truth in Regulatory Science	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article	en_US
Appears in Collections:	Journal Article