Power Analysis Attack on Locking SIB based IJTAG Achitecture

Abstract

Today's integrated circuits contain a large number and variety of embedded instruments that support testing, infield monitoring, post-silicon validation, etc. The IEEE Std. 1687 (IJTAG) provides efficient access to these embedded instruments by dynamically reconfiguring the IJTAG network. At the same time, it opens a backdoor for malicious users to steal sensitive information. Hence, access to embedded instruments through IJTAG must be restricted/secured. Various techniques have been proposed to prevent unauthorized access to the IJTAG network. One such very effective technique that improves the security of IJTAG network is a secure access protocol that uses licensed access software, Locking SIB (LSIB) and Chip ID. Although this technique is simple to implement and is very effective against scan attacks

however, it does not consider the power analysis attack.In this study, it is demonstrated that the security of the secure access protocol technique could be easily breached using a power analysis side-channel attack. The attack leads to unauthorized access to the embedded instruments which in turn could be used for various malicious purposes. Moreover, a countermeasure that mitigates the efficacy of power analysis attack significantly is proposed. It incurs a minimal area overhead and can be easily integrated into the existing secure access protocol. © 2022 IEEE.